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Appellant's Reply Brief on this cross-appeal raises a hand-full of issues
requiring response including (1) the veracity of certain "supplemental facts" and the
admissibility of evidence taken in supplemental proceedings; (2) whether appellant's
denial that he made the contract found by the District Court, and assertion that he
complied only with a fundamentally different contract, leaves open an issue whether
he breached the contract found by the District Court; and (3) whether Veralynn Porter
"assumed" an obligation of Quality Maintenance Systems ("QMS"), which no one
asserts QMS had.

SUPPLEMENTAL FACTS/EVIDENCE
Appellant's claim that the supplementary facts asserted by appellee "are
erroneous" is irrelevant semantic quibble. In response to Appellant's claims about
specific paragraphs of the supplemental facts, appellee asserts:
f b.

While asserting that Advanced Maintenance Services ("AMS")

disappeared and QMS was not a continuation of AMS, appellant does not dispute that
QMS was formed to, and did "continue the maintenance work for 7-Eleven formerly
done by AMS" (Finding No. 30), that it did so with "the previous AMS employees,
equipment, stock accounts, books and premises" (Finding No. 33), or that "Slone
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owns fifty percent ( 5 0 % ) . . . and Veralynn owns fifty percent (50%)" of QMS (Ex.
7, f 5, quoted p. 14 Opening Brief of Cross-Appellant). It is conceded, but irrelevant,
that QMS did not use the name AMS or employ Mr. Cowley. There is no question
that the business done by QMS was the business of AMS, purchased by the Porters
from the Cowleys.
| f c, d. Appellee asserts that payments to purchase AMS were in fact made
from funds belonging to the Porters. See Finding No. 43 ("The Porters paid the
Cowleys $4,000/month . . . ."). Appellant does not deny that the Porters were joint
owners of QMS; thus, joint owners of its income. Appellant does not claim that
paragraph "d" of the "supplemental facts" does not correctly quote appellant's
admission that payments were due from the Porters, whatever entity they used. The
rest of appellant's objection is empty semantics.
Appellant's claim, that evidence of testimony under oath in supplemental
proceedings may not be shown because raised for the first time on appeal, is
incoherent.

The Affidavit of Kerin Cowley, in issue, is attached to appellee's

opening brief, plainly paginated as part of the record below. It was submitted to the
District Court on a motion to amend the part of the judgment releasing Veralynn
Porter as a defendant, decision of which motion is appealed. There is no question the
evidence was properly before the District Court, as admissions of appellant
2

demonstrating that the evidence relied upon in the Judgment was false. It is properly
before this Court on appeal.
It is disturbing that appellant's present attempt to hide this evidence extends
the attempt to deceive the District Court below about the part in this matter played by
Veralynn Porter. Appellant knows that his testimony in supplemental proceedings
was under oath, at the direction of the District Court, not an "interview". Had
appellant ever questioned that the affidavit accurately represents appellant's
testimony under oath in supplemental hearings, he could have filed a
counter-affidavit. He never did. His counsel who attended the hearing and heard the
testimony could deny the accuracy of the affidavit. He never has. He did not do so
when the District Court ordered further supplemental proceedings based upon the
testimony. The effort here is simply to prolong the fraudulent basis upon which
appellant procured the dismissal of Veralynn Porter, as a means of obstructing
enforcement of the judgment.

AMENDMENT
Appellant argues that the Complaint was not amended by going to trial on the
District Court's order, procured by appellant, defining the issue for trial as which, if
either, alternative agreement alleged should be enforced in lieu of conducting a
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judicial dissolution. This is based upon an alleged rule that "whether the pleadings
should be deemed amended" depends upon "whether the opposing party had a fair
opportunity to defend and whether it could offer additional evidence if the case were
re-tried on a different theory." Reply Brief at 4. Appellant claims that breach of any
contract found, and any defense thereto, was never raised below. Further, appellant
says, "The fact that an enforceable agreement was reached, does not, afortiorari (sic),
mean that either party breached the agreement or that either party is liable to pay
damages stemming from a breach of the contract." Reply Brief at 5.
The difficulty with this, of course, is that it is alleged that one contract, not
another, was made and performed. In that case, alleged compliance with the first
contract is a defense to breach of the other, unless the Court finds that the other
contract was the one made: then that defense becomes an admission of breach.
Appellant's attempted proof that he made and performed only an oral $240,000
purchase, was an affirmative defense to the claim that he made, but did not perform,
a $600,000 contract. At the same time, evidence of making installment payments
consistent only with a $240,000 purchase, does prove a fortiori, breach of the
$600,000 purchase found by the District Court. It is impossible to prove payments
on only $240,000 without proving breach of an agreement to pay $600,000. This also
shows that appellant could not offer additional evidence about breach, without
4

disavowing the evidence he has presented to date. Finally, of course, had the District
Court not enforced the $600,000 purchase, it would have conducted a judicial
dissolution. It was the potential that such dissolution would have set a far higher
price than $600,000 which appellant had sought to avoid by procuring from the
District Court an order bifurcating the trial to rule first on potential buy-out contracts.
That is, appellant got what he asked for.
That "plaintiff cannot amend the complaint by raising novel claims or theories
of recovery in a memorandum in opposition to [a motion] to dismiss or for summary
judgment" (Reply Brief at 4), has nothing to do with this case. Appellant made no
motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, and appellee filed no opposition to one.
Appellant's claim, on the first morning of trial, that QMS had just been fired
by 7-Eleven, thus appellant was absolved of obligations to appellee, certainly raised
no defense to appellant's long-standing breach. The District Court properly rejected
the effort to raise claims not previously plead or subject to discovery.
Appellant's claims about amendment of the Complaint are utterly without
merit, imposed for no discernible purpose but delay. They validate appellee's claim
for fees.

5

VERALYNN PORTER
The District Court first defined the issue for trial as whether the defendants,
Slone and Veralynn Porter, made an enforceable agreement to purchase Mr.
Cowley's share of AMS, obviating any need to judicially dissolve AMS. The District
Court then found that "the Porters" offered $600,000, but that "the Porters" paid only
$4,000/month, demonstrating, with the remaining evidence, an agreement to
purchase for $600,000 and its breach. Finally, however, the District Court released
Veralynn Porter as a defendant, upon the ground that she did not own a stock interest
in AMS before the agreement to purchase. While this may have had some bearing
upon a judicial dissolution (see §§ 16-10a-1430(2), 16-10a-1431, 16-10a-1434,
U.C.A. (1953).), it had no bearing at all upon the admitted fact that Veralynn Porter
was a joint obligor on the contract found by the District Court to buy AMS. The
District Court never reached the issue of judicial dissolution, finding instead an
enforceable buy-out contract.
Apparently, the District Court thought the latter a sufficient ground to release
Veralynn Porter, notwithstanding its specific findings that both Porters offered to buy
AMS (Finding No. 20), that an agreement arose when plaintiffs accepted the terms
offered by both Porters (Finding No. 36), that the business was turned over to both
Porters (Finding No. 32), that both Porters became owners of the entity formed to
6

carry on the business purchased (Finding No. 30) and that both Porters paid the price
agreed. Finding No. 43.
The District Court did not alter any of these findings. It declined to alter its
ruling releasing Veralynn Porter when presented with admissions that she had been
the sole owner of the re-incorporated business for many months prior to the trial.
The issue of the propriety of Veralynn Porter's release can be decided simply
upon the basis that whether she owned part of AMS prior to the purchase of Mr.
Cowley's share is wholly irrelevant, in view of the District Court's findings
demonstrating that she was an obligor in that purchase. It is not insignificant,
however, that many months before trial she voluntarily became the sole owner of the
entity formed to carry on the business purchased and the sole payor on the purchase,
without substantial consideration for transfer of the business to her. The significance
of these facts is that they resolve any question about Veralynn Porter's status as
obligor, and show a clear assumption of such status, notwithstanding claims to the
contrary.
It is difficult, therefore, to understand appellant's assertion that:
There is no evidence of record to support Appellee's theory that Mrs.
Porter has somehow personally assumed the judgment debt in this case.
In support of this argument Appellee has cited no transcript from any
proceeding or examination, no affidavit or statement under oath, no
citation to any record, and none of the admitted evidence of t r i a l . . . .
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Appellant's Brief at 7-8.
In addition to the supplementary facts discussed above, to which appellant has
failed to respond in any significant way, Appellee's Brief cites in support of Veralynn
Porter's status as obligor, the District Court's Findings of Fact numbered 4, 6, 9, 11,
14, 20, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 45 and 47.
Respecting the participation of both Porters in creating an obligation to appellee, these
Findings set out the following narrative:
At the meeting the Porters indicated they wanted to buy out Tracy
Cowley's interest in AMS. They offered to pay $600,000 in cash in
monthly installments of $10,000.00 paid over five years without interest,
to transfer 100% of SLS [Straight Line Striping, owned fifty percent by
Veralynn Porter] to the Cowleys and to give Tracy Cowley his choice of
the Listo [owned twenty-five percent by Veralynn Porter] properties
either in Midway or the one in St. George.
Finding No. 20.
During the evening of June 23, the Cowleys agreed among themselves
that they would accept the buy-out terms submitted by the Porters with
certain changes that Mr. Cowley would submit to the Porters on June
24.
Finding No. 25.
. . . the Porters took steps to form Quality Maintenance Systems (QMS),
which the Porters incorporated on June 25, 2002, as owners to
continue the maintenance work for 7-Eleven formerly done by
AMS.
Finding No. 30.
8

Both Cowley and the Porters informed deBesche that Cowley had
agreed to sell out to the Porters and would leave AMS.
Finding No. 31.
After June 27, 2002, the parties began to perform the terms of the
written buy-out agreement of June 24 . Mr. Cowley vacated the AMS
offices in Midway, delivering the previous AMS employees, equipment,
stock accounts, books and premises to the Porters. They divided the
$50,000.00 cash funds of an AMS investment account.
Finding No. 32.
The Porters then indicated at the July 19th meeting, that because AMS
was temporarily on a "time and materials basis" pending the re-bidding
the 7-Eleven contracts in the Fall, QMS could only afford to pay
Cowleys $4,000.00 a month and not the $10,000.00 a month they had
previously offered and which the Cowleys had ultimately accepted.
The $4,000.00 figure was a unilaterally arrived figure submitted by the
Porters.
Finding No. 36.
On October 21, 2002 the Cowleys demanded that the Porters bring the
payments for the buy-out of AMS up to the $10,000/month level
because they had successful (sic) re-obtained the 7-Eleven contracts.
The Porters said they would consider start (sic) making the
$10,000/month payments and get back to them.
Finding No. 41.
The Porters have paid the Cowleys $4,000/month from August, 2002
through the present.
Finding No. 43.
Appellant does not now seriously contest that "all payments . . . by the Porters
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for the buy-out of AMS were from funds owned jointly by Slone and Veralynn
Porter", or that this was because "the buy-out agreement... required payment of the
price by 'Slone Porter and Veralynn Porter'."
In fact, it is impossible to string together, from the Memorandum Decision,
sufficient statements of fact referring to Slone Porter alone to show the elements of
even a rudimentary agreement, let alone the agreement actually enforced by the
District Court. The agreement ultimately enforced by the District Court was that
described throughout the Findings as having been made by "the Porters".
Further, the ground for dismissal of Veralynn Porter as a defendant was not
that she was not shown - and found - to have been an offeror, beneficiary/obligor,
payor, in the contract enforced by the District Court, but that she was not a
"shareholder" or did not have an "ownership interest" in, AMS prior to its sale.
Appellant now concedes that this conclusion was not even correct: Veralynn Porter
owned significant parts of subsidiaries of AMS transferred as part of the buy-out.
From this the District Court apparently would have concluded that Veralynn Porter
was not a necessary party in a judicial dissolution proceeding. While that conclusion
was likely wrong where the business was seized and operated by both Porters for
years before any such dissolution, it is immaterial. The issues tried by the District
Court were whether AMS had been sold by agreement, to whom, upon what terms,
10

and whether there had been compliance.
Appellant now asserts four reasons why Veralynn Porter was not a proper
party, as follows:
1.

QMS was not a party.

2.

Veralynn Porter never assumed a debt of QMS.

3.

The District Court declined to consider a new defense, broached the

morning of trial, that as QMS was going out of business, Porter no longer had to pay.
4.

The transfer of QMS to Veralynn Porter was not fraudulent.

None of these objections is pertinent.
Of course, QMS was not a party. Both of those who became its owners were
parties. This is because the agreement the District Court found that such owners
made orally on the morning of June 24, 2002, as set out in partially executed Exhibit
5 and thereafter actually performed, pre-dated the existence of QMS. QMS could not
have entered into such agreement. Exhibit 5 - needless to say - does not mention
QMS. There is nothing to show that the Cowleys ever heard of QMS before
completing their performance under the agreement. While the corporate status of
QMS would have affected its future relations with, for example, customers, it had no
effect upon the Cowleys: the fact that Porters created a corporate shell to operate and
pay for their prior individual acquisition is irrelevant. The latter is also true for
11

purposes of any judicial dissolution.
The obligation of Veralynn Porter as purchaser of the Cowleys' interest in
AMS was assumed in her own right. It is irrelevant that she never assumed an
obligation of QMS, which it never had. The importance of QMS is that it was
admittedly created after the fact of the agreement to purchase AMS, to assume and
conduct the business purchased and that Veralynn Porter was admittedly a half owner
of it from the outset. Half of its income belonged to her. Thus, the fact that payments
on the agreement with Cowley were always made from the account of QMS on
checks signed by Veralynn Porter, demonstrates that Veralynn Porter, owner of fifty
percent (50%) of QMS, must have participated in directing that payments be made
from the QMS account, and that she must have done so to cover her debt.
Whether the transfer of Slone Porter's half of QMS to Veralynn Porter for
$1.00 would be found fraudulent is irrelevant to her status as defendant. From and
after the transfer, which occurred many months before trial and about which the
Porters admittedly deceived the District Court, the income of QMS, and authority to
direct its payment to Cowleys, belonged solely to Veralynn Porter. She directed such
payment to meet her obligation as a purchaser of AMS. That she did so was wholly
inconsistent with the claim that Slone alone was obligated to pay.
The District Court quite properly rejected a hitherto unheard of defense
12

broached the morning of trial, particularly one which made no sense. Porters showed
up the morning of trial, two years after they had taken control of the business, with a
claim that insofar as they had not been able to maintain the business, which they
chose to blame on the maintenance of the Cowleys' suit, they were excused from
paying the Cowleys.

The District Court declined to go for, "If you sue me

successfully, you still lose, because I spent all the money putting up a bad defense."
Nothing in the District Court's refusal to hear such a claim prevented disclosure or
encouraged concealment, of the current ownership of QMS.
Veralynn Porter was admittedly a purchaser of, and obligor to pay for, AMS.
She was an essential defendant.

The suggestion that, if the District Court had

conducted a judicial dissolution, she would not have been a necessary party is
patently irrelevant. The District Court enforced an agreement in which she was an
obligor, in lieu of conducting a judicial dissolution.

VERACITY
Appellant now makes much of the District Court's finding No. 45 that, "Both
the plaintiff and the defendant testified at trial differently then (sic) sworn statements
they gave in affidavits they filed with the Court at various stages of litigation in this
case. The credibility of both the Cowleys and the Porters is difficult to ascertain by
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the Court."
Notwithstanding the "difficulty" of ascertaining the credibility of the Cowleys,
the undisguisable fact is that the District Court managed to consistently determine
that the Cowleys told the truth and the Porters did not. All of the significant facts
were determined in conformity with the Cowleys' testimony, and in derogation of the
Porter's testimony.
It is true that, prior to the discovery which produced the critical documents,
Mr. Cowley filed an affidavit asserting the lack of an agreement to purchase AMS.
No other example of contrary testimony is anywhere suggested. However, Mr.
Cowley's mistake, if any, was plainly one of law, not of fact, based upon the advice
of counsel that an oral agreement, disputed by the opposition, was legally no
agreement at all. Mr. Cowley so explained it at trial. Further, whatever the evidence
of part performance, which the District Court insisted upon trying though it differed
not a particle from the uncontested facts presented on summary judgment, the legal
fact, never grasped by the District Court, was that the Cowleys were always entitled
to treat the agreement, which the District Court ultimately enforced, as no agreement
because the Porters always admitted its breach and repudiation by them. That fact
alone justified Mr. Cowley's assertion that no agreement exited.
It was always obvious in this case that there was never a grain of substance to
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the defense of an alternative oral contract which arose on July 19, 2002, after the
great majority of what was called "part performance" of it. That the District Court
ultimately so decided does not alter the fact that efficient disposition of the matter
was to strike this absurdity early on, and give defendants the option of affirming the
agreement ultimately enforced if plaintiffs' would, or paying the real value of the
business as established in a judicial dissolution.

Any objection to this course

evaporates in light of the fact that the District Court was unable to find a single fact
which in any way supported the Porters' defense. In the end, the District Court did
not even attempt to ascertain whether facts had been alleged indicating the possibility
of a July 19, 2002 contract for $240,000. That is, the substantial issues before the
District Court were never more than confirmation of the $600,000 agreement of June
24,2002, or judicial dissolution. There was never a substantial defense. Finding No.
45 is by way of excuse for an unduly prolonged proceeding, which improperly ousted
plaintiff of the right to opt for a judicial dissolution.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 11th day of August, 2005.
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15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 11th day of August, 2005,1 caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing "REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLEE, AND
CROSS-APPELLANT " to be mailed by U.S. mail, first-class postage prepaid, to:
Jeffrey R. Price (6315)
Christopher C.Hill (9583)
BOSTWICK & PRICE, P.C.
139 E. South Temple, #320
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
ph: (801) 961-7400

E. Craig Smay

16

